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Abstract-This paper outlines some important issues that relate
to security attacks against mobile ad hoc networks from 
research carried out at Network Research Group, University of 
Plymouth, on designing intrusion detection system for mobile ad 
hoc network. In designing security mechanisms for mobile ad 
hoc networks, one must consider the attacks variations as well as 
the characteristics of the attacks that could be launched against 
the ad hoc networks. The discussions of these two aspects are 
summarized in this paper. This paper also classifies several 
common attacks against the ad hoc networks routing protocols 
based upon the techniques that could be used by attackers to 
exploit routing messages. Those techniques are modification, 
interception, fabrication, and interruption.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in computer networking have introduced 
a new technology for future wireless communication, a 
mobile ad hoc network (MANET). This technology, which is 
the combination of peer-to-peer techniques, wireless 
communications, and mobile computing, provides convenient 
infrastructure-less communications and could be very useful 
to provide communications for many applications especially 
when the infrastructure networks is not feasible. MANET 
could be used to overcome geographical constraints in a 
military operation. As it is easy to deploy, it may also very 
useful to assist in the disaster relief operations where 
temporary network infrastructure is immediately needed to 
replace the damaged infrastructure networks.  
However, similar to other networks, MANET also 
vulnerable to many security attacks. MANET not only 
inherits all the security threats faced in both wired and 
wireless networks, but it also introduces security attacks 
unique to itself [1]. As people will be encouraged to use a 
secured network, it is important to provide MANET with 
reliable security mechanisms if we want to see this exciting 
technology become widely used in a next few years. Before 
the development of any security measure to secure mobile ad 
hoc networks, it is important to study the variety of attacks 
that might be related to such networks. With the knowledge 
of some common attack issues, researchers might have a 
better understanding of how mobile ad hoc networks could be 
threatened by the attackers, and thus might lead to the 
development of more reliable security measures in protecting 
them.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the 
important issues that might be related to security attacks in 
mobile ad hoc networks. In Section II, we see how attacks 
against the ad hoc networks may vary depending upon in 
which environment the attacks are launched, what 
communication layer the attacks are targeting, and what level 
of ad hoc network mechanisms are targeted. After 
considering these three variations, it is also important to 
investigate the characteristics of attacks against the ad hoc 
networks. This issue is discussed in Section III. In this paper, 
we give a special attention to attacks that could be launched 
against the routing protocols. We identified that most of the 
attacks against ad hoc networks routing protocols are actually 
launched by exploiting the routing messages, and further 
classify them based upon the techniques that could be used to 
exploit routing messages in Section IV. Finally, we conclude 
our study and present our future work in Section V.  
II. ATTACKS VARIATIONS 
A. Ad hoc networks environments
Ad hoc network can exist in one of three environments;
organized, localized, and open environments. Nodes in all of 
these environments are generally threatened by the same 
security problems. However, there are some security 
problems, that are unique to one environment and need more 
attention in that environment than the others need. Vast 
numbers of unstructured nodes and the absence of a priori
relations are some of the main characteristics of the open 
environment ad hoc networks. Such networks are quite 
similar to the localized environment networks, but the larger 
amount of nodes, and the wider coverage area, renders nodes 
in the open environment to more sophisticated security 
attacks than the localized networks do. For instance, nodes in 
both open and localized environments suffer from the 
absence of a central authority. However, this is not a big issue 
in a localized environment, because nodes in that 
environment might have a physical contact with each other to 
employ any security measures. Security could also be easily 
enforced in the organized environment because nodes in that 
environment are usually pre-employed with appropriate 
security measures before they participate in any specific tasks 
such as in a military operation.  
B. Communication layers
Each layer in the ad hoc networks communication
protocols has its own vulnerabilities. In a physical layer, 
mobile nodes as well as the communication links are 
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vulnerable to both passive and active attacks. Passive 
eavesdropping, signal jamming, denial of service (DoS) 
attacks, and physical hardware tampering are among the most 
popular attacks in this layer [2]. Such attacks could be made 
less useful by encrypting the communication signal, 
employing spread-spectrum communication technology, and 
using a tamper-resistant hardware.  
Similar link jamming and DoS attacks are also threatening 
the ad hoc networks at the data link layer. At this layer, 
adversaries might jam the communication links by sending 
huge data to the networks, or by replaying unnecessary 
packets to exhaust the networks’ resources. Expensive 
cryptography algorithms and more sophisticated security 
measures could be very useful at this layer to protect the 
networks and to distinguish between valid and invalid packets 
traversed in the networks.  
Attackers are also threatening the ad hoc networks at both 
the transport and the application layers. At the transport layer, 
messages are exchanged on the end-to-end basis using 
secured routes established in the network layer. For that 
reason, ensuring security at the network layer is very 
important to provide reliable communication at the transport 
layer. Similar to the other types of networks, attackers can 
always find a loophole in the ad hoc networks’ applications 
and might use this vulnerability to launch attacks at the 
application layer. However, since similar attacks also occur in 
the other types of networks, regular solutions used in wired 
networks could be reused to defend the ad hoc networks 
against attacks at the application layer.  
Besides providing reliable routes to exchange messages in 
the transport layer, network layer also provides the most 
critical service in the ad hoc network, which is the routing 
protocol. Several routing protocols have been introduced to 
provide reliable communication among nodes, but less 
attention to the security aspects when designing such 
protocols has opened many security holes at this layer [3].  
C. Attack level 
There are two main levels of attack in the ad hoc network; 
attacks against the basic mechanisms and attacks against the 
security mechanisms [4]. Ad hoc networks have their own 
unique basic mechanisms, such as the use of wireless links 
for communications, employing their own routing strategies, 
and operate in a distributed manner. All these basic 
mechanisms are actually reflecting to their own unique 
characteristics that differentiate them from other types of 
networks. Attackers might launch many security attacks 
against these basic mechanisms. For instance, attackers could 
launch passive eavesdropping attacks against the wireless 
links, drain off node’s limited resources, and launch active 
attacks to interrupt the routing mechanisms.  
Responding to many security attacks against the ad hoc 
network basic mechanisms, researchers have introduced a 
number of security measures to protect the networks. 
However, all these security measures are also vulnerable to 
attacks and need to be secure. Examples of attacks against 
security mechanisms are stealing username and password to 
get unauthorized access in the networks and modifying public 
key databases to disrupt authentication, confidentiality, and 
integrity services. 
III. ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS 
Dynamic topology, distributed operation, and resource 
constraints are some of the unique characteristics that exist in 
the ad hoc networks, which inevitably increase the 
vulnerability of such network. Many characteristics might be 
used to classify attacks in the ad hoc networks. Examples 
would include looking at the behaviour of the attacks (passive 
vs. active), the source of the attacks (external vs. internal), the 
processing capability of the attackers (mobile vs. wired), and 
the number of the attackers (single vs. multiple).  
A. Passive vs. active attacks 
Passive attacks are launched to steal valuable information 
in the targeted networks. Examples of passive attacks in ad 
hoc network are eavesdropping attacks and traffic analysis 
attacks. Detecting this kind of attack is difficult because 
neither the system resources nor the critical network 
functions are physically affected to prove the intrusions [5].  
While passive attacks do not intend to disrupt the network 
operations, active attacks on the other hand actively alter the 
data with the intention to obstruct the operation of the 
targeted networks. Examples of active attacks comprise 
actions such as message modifications, message replays, 
message fabrications and the denial of service attacks. 
B. External vs. internal attacks 
External attacks are attacks launched by adversaries who 
are not initially authorized to participate in the network 
operations. These attacks usually aim to cause network 
congestion, denying access to specific network function or to 
disrupt the whole network operations. Bogus packets 
injection, denial of service, and impersonation are some of 
the attacks that are usually initiated by the external attackers.  
More severe attacks in the ad hoc networks might come 
from the second source of attacks, which is the internal attack. 
Internal attacks are initiated by the authorized nodes in the 
networks, and might come from both compromised and 
misbehaving nodes. Internal nodes are identified as 
compromised nodes if the external attackers hijacked the 
authorized internal nodes and are then using them to launch 
attacks against the ad hoc networks. Security requirements 
such as authentication, confidentiality and integrity are 
severely vulnerable in the ad hoc networks with the 
compromised internal nodes because communication keys 
used by these nodes might be stolen and passed to the other 
colluding attackers. On the other hand, nodes will be 
classified as misbehaving if they are authorized to access the 
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system resources, but fail to use these resources in a way they 
should be [6]. Internal nodes might misbehave to save their 
limited resources, such as the battery powers, the processing 
capabilities, and the communication bandwidth. Attacks that 
are caused by the misbehaving internal nodes are difficult to 
detect because to distinguish between normal network 
failures and misbehaviour activities in the ad hoc networks is 
not an easy task. 
C. Mobile vs. wired attackers 
Mobile attackers are attackers that have the same 
capabilities as the other nodes in the ad hoc networks. Since 
they have the same resources limitations, their capabilities to 
harm the networks operations are also limited. For instance, 
with the limited transmitting capabilities and battery powers, 
mobile attackers could only jam the wireless links within its 
vicinity. They are not capable to launch the network jamming 
attacks to disrupt the whole networks operations.  
On the other hand, wired attackers are attackers that are 
capable of gaining access to the external resources such as the 
electricity. Since they have more resources, they could launch 
more severe attacks in the networks, such as jamming the 
whole networks or breaking expensive cryptography 
algorithms. Existence of the wired attackers in the ad hoc 
networks (especially in the open environment networks) is 
always possible as long as the wired attackers are able to 
locate themselves in the communication range and have 
access to the wired infrastructures. 
D. Single vs. multiple attackers 
Attackers might choose to launch attacks against the ad 
hoc networks independently or by colluding with the other 
attackers. One man action or single attackers usually generate 
a moderate traffic load as long as they are not capable to 
reach any wired facilities. Since they also have similar 
abilities to the other nodes in the networks, their limited 
resources become the weak points to them [7]. For instance, 
complex cryptography algorithms could be used to help in 
defending the authentication, integrity, and the confidentiality 
services from a single attacker. As it becomes very expensive 
for the single attackers to break the encrypted messages, 
nodes in the networks could share the expensive 
cryptography workloads with each other by exploiting the 
distributed operations and the multiple connections they had 
among them.  
However, if several attackers are colluding to launch 
attacks, defending the ad hoc networks against them will be 
much harder. Colluding attackers could easily shut down any 
single node in the network and be capable to degrading the 
effectiveness of network’s distributed operations including 
the security mechanisms. Adding to the severity, colluding 
attackers could be widely distributed or reside at the certain 
area where they presumed high communication rate in the 
networks exist. If no suitable security measures employed, 
nodes in that targeted area are susceptible to any kind of 
denial of service (DoS) attacks that could be launched by the 
colluding attackers.  
IV. ATTACKS AGAINST ROUTING MESSAGES 
Routing is one of the most vital mechanisms in the ad hoc 
networks. Improper and insecure routing mechanisms will not 
only degrade the performance of the ad hoc networks, but 
will also render such networks vulnerable to many security 
attacks. One of the basic elements in the routing mechanism 
is the routing message, which is used to establish and 
maintain relationships between nodes in the networks. The 
importance of the routing message has made it a main target 
by the attackers to launch attacks against the ad hoc networks 
[3, 8]. Attacks against the routing messages could be 
launched in many forms and may include all the 
characteristics described in Section III. In this work, attacks 
against routing messages are classified based on the 
classification suggested by Stallings in [9]. In such 
classification, information or messages could be deviated 
from the normal operation flow using modification, 
interception, interruption or fabrication attacks. In a more 
severe case, attackers also might use any combination of 
these attacks to disrupt the normal information flow. As far as 
our concern, this study is the first to address security attacks 
against the ad hoc networks routing messages. 
A. Modification 
In a message modification attack, adversaries make some 
changes to the routing messages, and thus endanger the 
integrity of the packets in the networks. Since nodes in the ad 
hoc networks are free to move and self-organize, 
relationships among nodes at some times might include the 
malicious nodes. These malicious nodes might exploit the 
sporadic relationships in the network to participate in the 
packet forwarding process, and later launch the message 
modification attacks. Examples of attacks that can be 
classified under the message modification attacks are packet 
misrouting and impersonation attacks. 
1) Packet misrouting attacks: In a packet misrouting attack, 
malicious nodes reroute traffic from their original path to 
make them reach the wrong destinations [10]. Attackers 
might misroute a packet to make it stay in the network longer 
than its lifetimes, thus render it to be dropped from the 
network. As a result, the source node needs to retransmit the 
lost packets and this will consume more bandwidth, as well 
as increasing the overhead in the networks. 
2) Impersonation attacks: The impersonation attacks, also 
called the spoofing attacks, are attacks where malicious node 
assumes the identity of another node in the networks [11]. By 
impersonating another node, attackers are able to receive 
routing messages that are directed to the nodes they faked. 
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Impersonation attacks are possible in the ad hoc networks 
because most of the current ad hoc routing protocols do not 
authenticate the routing packets. As a result, malicious nodes 
might exploit this loophole to masquerade as another node by 
modifying the contents of the packets. 
B. Interception 
Attackers might launch the interception attacks to get an 
unauthorized access to the routing messages that are not 
intentionally sent to them. This kind of attack jeopardizes the 
integrity of the packets because such packets might be 
modified before being forwarded to the next hop. Besides, the 
intercepted packets might also be analysed before passed to 
the destination thus violating the confidentiality. Examples of 
attacks that can be classified under the interception attacks 
are wormhole attacks, black hole attacks, and routing packet 
analysis attacks.
1) Wormhole attacks: In the wormhole attacks, a 
compromised node in the ad hoc networks colludes with 
external attacker to create a shortcut in the networks.  By 
creating this shortcut, they could trick the source node to win 
in the route discovery process and later launch the 
interception attacks. Packets from these two colluding 
attackers are usually transmitted using wired connection to 
create the fastest route from source to the destination node. In 
addition, if the wormhole nodes consistently maintain the 
bogus routes, they could permanently deny other routes from 
being established. As a result, the intermediate nodes reside 
along that denied routes are unable to participate in the 
network operations.  
2) Black hole attacks: In this attack, malicious nodes trick 
all their neighbouring nodes to attract all the routing packets 
to them. As in the wormhole attacks, malicious nodes could 
launch the black hole attacks by advertising themselves to the 
neighbouring nodes as having the most optimal route to the 
requested destinations. However, unlike in the wormhole 
attacks where multiple attackers colluded to attack one 
neighbouring node, in the black hole attacks, only one 
attacker is involved and it threatens all its neighbouring nodes. 
3) Routing packet analysis attacks: Since no disruptive 
action occurs, routing packet analysis could be classified as 
one of the passive attacks against the ad hoc networks. One 
way to launch this attack is by exploiting the promiscuous
mode employed in the ad hoc network. In a promiscuous
mode, if node A is the neighbour of both nodes B and C at a 
particular time, node A can always hear the transmissions 
between node B and node C. By exploiting this nature, node 
A is able to analyze the overheard packets transmitted 
between node B and node C. More explanation regarding the 
promiscuous mode in the ad hoc networks can be found in 
[12]. Besides, malicious nodes could also launch this attack 
by exploiting the nature in a multi hop routing. In multi hop 
routing, packets need to be forwarded through several 
intermediate nodes before reaching the actual destination. 
Malicious nodes might exploit this opportunity by locating 
themselves in any location along the route to participate in 
the message forwarding process and later launch the routing 
packet analysis attacks. 
C. Fabrication 
Instead of modifying or interrupting the existing routing 
packets in the networks, malicious nodes also could fabricate 
their own packets to cause chaos in the network operations. 
They could launch the message fabrication attacks by 
injecting huge packets into the networks such as in the sleep 
deprivation attacks. However, message fabrication attacks are 
not only launch by the malicious nodes. Such attacks also 
might come from the internal misbehaving nodes such as in 
the route salvaging attacks.  
1) Sleep deprivation attacks: This kind of attack is actually 
more specific to the mobile ad hoc networks. The aim is to 
drain off limited resources in the mobile ad hoc nodes (e.g. 
the battery powers), by constantly makes them busy 
processing unnecessary packets. In a routing protocol, sleep 
deprivation attacks might be launched by flooding the 
targeted node with unnecessary routing packets. For instance, 
attackers could flood any node in the networks by sending a 
huge number of route request (RREQ), route replies (RREP) 
or route error (RERR) packets to the targeted node. As a 
result, that particular node is unable to participate in the 
routing mechanisms and rendered unreachable by the other 
nodes in the networks. 
2) Route salvaging attacks: Route salvaging attacks are 
launched by the greedy internal nodes in the networks. In a 
mobile ad hoc network, there is no guarantee that each 
transmitted packet will successfully reach the desired 
destination node [13]. Packets might not reach the destination 
node because of the natural network failures or might be 
under attacks by the adversaries. Therefore, to salvage their 
packets from such failures, misbehaving internal nodes might 
duplicate and retransmit their packets although no sending 
error messages received. The effects of the route salvaging 
attacks might be more severe if there are many greedy nodes 
in the networks. Besides draining off more resources in 
intermediate and destination nodes, this attack might also 
cause the consumption of unnecessary bandwidth. 
D. Interruption 
Interruption attacks are launched to deny routing messages 
from reaching the destination nodes. Adversaries could do 
this by either attacking the routing messages or attacking the 
mobile nodes in the networks. Actually, most of the attacks 
launched in the modification, interception, and fabrication 
attacks are aimed to interrupt the normal operations of the ad 
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hoc networks. For instance, adversaries aiming to interrupt 
the availability service in the networks might destroy all 
paths to a particular victim node by using the message 
modification attacks. In a message fabrication attack, 
adversaries could overload the networks by injecting huge 
unnecessary packets. Examples of attacks that could be 
classified under the interruption attacks category are packet 
dropping attacks, flooding attacks, and lack of cooperation 
attacks.
1) Packet dropping attacks: Direct interruption to the 
routing messages could be done by using the packet dropping 
attacks. In a standard packet dropping attack, an adversary 
collaborates as usual in the route discovery process and 
launches the constant packet dropping attacks if it is included 
as one of the intermediate nodes. In addition, instead of 
constantly dropping all the packets, adversaries might vary 
their techniques using random, selective, or periodic packet 
dropping attacks to help their interrupting behaviour remain 
concealed [14].  
2) Flooding attacks: Adversaries also might interrupt the 
normal operations in the packet forwarding process by 
flooding the targeted destination nodes with huge 
unnecessary packets. Nodes under the flooding attacks are 
unable to receive or forward any packet thus all the packets 
directed to them will be discarded from network.  
3) Lack of cooperation attacks: Lack of cooperation from 
the internal nodes to participate in the network operations can 
also be seen as an attempt to launch a refusal of service attack. 
In such attacks, internal nodes are discouraged to cooperate in 
the network operations that did not benefit them because 
participating in such operations will drain off their resources. 
Misbehaving internal nodes might use different strategies to 
save their limited resources. They might refuse to forward the 
other node’s packets, not send back the route error report to 
the sender when failing to forward packets, or might turn off 
their devices when not sending any packet in the networks. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, one can see that attacks against the ad hoc 
networks may vary depend on (1) which environment the 
attacks are launched, (2) what communication layer the 
attacks are targeting, and (3) what level of ad hoc network 
mechanisms are targeted. One can also see that there are 
several attack characteristics that must be considered in 
designing any security measure for the ad hoc network. By 
investigating the characteristics and variations of the attacks, 
one can make a long list of attacks that could be launch 
against the ad hoc networks. However, since this study is 
focusing on the vulnerabilities of the ad hoc networks routing 
protocols, only some of the common attacks that could be 
launched against the ad hoc network routing protocols have 
been investigated. From the investigation, we identified that 
most of the common attacks against the ad hoc networks 
routing protocols are actually launched by exploiting the 
routing messages. From there, we further classify attacks 
against the routing protocols based upon the techniques that 
could be used by the attacker to exploit routing messages. In 
a future work, several security solutions that have been 
proposed to secure routing protocols will be investigated and 
classified based on this classification. The investigation will 
include various techniques that might be employed in 
protecting, detecting, and responding to the attacks against 
the routing messages. 
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